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Consequence argument

The Consequence Argument is a philosophical argument for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. The argument was most notably introduced by philosopher Peter van Inwagen in an article titled “The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism” (1975). According to van Inwagen, if determinism is true, then a complete description of the past together with the laws of nature is enough to determine the truth of any proposition. It follows that given determinism, the truth of any proposition is never such that we can do anything that could make the proposition true or false.

In later work van Inwagen would state the argument as follows:If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us.If the above reasoning is correct, then compatibilism is false. The argument is, however, neutral with respect to the truth of hard determinism or libertarian free will. Adherents of either side often defend this argument as showing the inconsistency of accepting both determinism and free will.

Wikipedia contributors, "Consequence argument", Wikipedia, revision 1385051112, retrieved 20 November 2026, source, CC BY-SA 4.0.

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